A Confusing NDP Photo

This picture came out yesterday from the NDP to show the party's position on the environment and the economy after some confusing comments from John Horgan about the Kinder Morgan pipeline on Tuesday.

The wording is odd because of how it can be read:

A strong economy means a healthy environment

The way I read the words is that if we have a strong economy we will have a healthy environment.   To me this is the most logical reading of the sentence.

Replace healthy environment with more income or early retirement and read the statement again.   As soon as you do that, it becomes clear the second phrase is intended to derived form or caused by the first.

I am certain this is not what the NDP intended because I asked some of them.   The NDP was trying to saying a strong economy comes from a healthy environment, which ultimately does not have to be true.

The NDP already has a problem with ambiguity because they are refusing to give the public any sense of how they would govern and what their priorities are for the province.   Releasing this ambiguous photo does not help people come to clarity on the NDP

I think what they wanted to say is a strong economy requires a healthy environment, but then again maybe they like the wording not being clear so there is nothing to hold them to?

 

Are BC Wildfires Evidence of Climate Change?

Since 2003 we have seen a significant shift in the area burned in BC wildfires.   Is this evidence of climate change?   It seems the most plausible explanation of what is going on.

To note on the graphs below:

1. Steam trains caused a lot of fires in BC and were phased out in the 1950s
2. The 1958 season was dramatic and part of that was the Kech fire which burned about 270,000 hectares
3. Wildfire fighting technology improved rapidly from the 50s though to the 80s.   A lot of fires were caught early and extinguished

Here is a table of area burned by year going back to 1920 which is the first year there is relatively complete data

Year Total Hectares

2016 98,462 - season not year over

2015 280,445

2014 369,169

2013 18,259

2012 111,645

2011 12,604

2010 337,149

2009 247,419

2008 13,240

2007 29,440

2006 139,265

2005 34,588

2004 220,518

2003 265,053

2002 8,539

2001 9,677

2000 17,673

1999 11,581

1998 76,574

1997 2,960

1996 20,669

1995 48,080

1994 30,310

1993 5,183

1992 30,453

1991 24,709

1990 75,783

1989 25,380

1988 11,482

1987 33,850

1986 17,260

1985 236,252

1984 19,908

1983 67,378

1982 348,663

1981 106,593

1980 65,578

1979 29,447

1978 50,081

1977 3,796

1976 57,020

1975 24,911

1974 21,728

1973 33,422

1972 26,087

1971 351,890

1970 105,688

1969 164,688

1968 13,519

1967 99,016

1966 177,268

1965 62,833

1964 3,135

1963 18,756

1962 18,461

1961 115,667

1960 285,820

1959 110,735

1958 835,848

1957 66,724

1956 190,060

1955 18,896

1954 4,172

1953 15,368

1952 61,677

1951 170,354

1950 343,274

1949 58,902

1948 155,544

1947 57,775

1946 122,780

1945 142,811

1944 204,831

1943 38,381

1942 180,710

1941 62,681

1940 198,297

1939 19,730

1938 78,292

1937 288,057

1936 22,196

1935 176,904

1934 19,372

1933 258,464

1932 122,005

1931 170,790

1930 402,646

1929 243,889

1928 368,103

1927 43,913

1926 67,035

1925 414,305

1924 162,767

1923 63,778

1922 634,772

1921 59,017

1920 157,762

British newsreel footage of the 1958 fire season in BC

Average Size of BC Wild Fires is going up over 1991-2014

Another graph using the Ministry of Forests data on wild fires in BC.   I will get around to doing one that shows the 10 year running average for the size of fires.

The other graphs I have done today:

Ten Year Averages for area burned in BC

Area Burned per Year 1991-2014 and Spending on Wild Fires 1991-2013

An academic paper from 2004 Detecting the effect of climate change on Canadian forest fires

Graphs of Area Burned in BC and Annual Wild Fire Spending from 1991 to 2013

I thought these two graphs would be interesting to see

In area burned four years really stand out but I think more telling are the minimums.  the 2008 and 2012 low fire years are much higher than the lows in the 1990s.

 I have not corrected this data for inflation

The average area of forest burned in BC each year has quadrupled since the 1990s

I noticed that in BC the area burned each year seems to have been going up since the early 1990s.   I decided to graph this and here is what I got.

The graph seems to show a fairly clear upward trend.   If 2014 continues as it seems to be at the moment, the 10 year average for 2005-2014 will be in the range 110,000 hectares.  If it becomes a big year, more than 200,000 hectares, that average rises to over 114,000

The data comes from the Ministry of Forests statistics for each year from 1991 to 2013.   I can only access data back to 1991 online.  

Meanwhile at the same time the average number of fires each year has held steady.  So far we have only had 562 fires this season.  The 10 year average would suggest we will see another 1400 more fires this year.

I will do some more on the data later.   

Kitimat Enbrdige Vote - the large No vote and a high turnout makes supporting Enbridge politically toxic.

Kitimat had a plebiscite on the Enbrdige pipeline on Saturday and the No to the pipeline side won a big victory, 58.4% to 41.6%.  A no vote in the community in BC that would benefit the most from the pipeline is stunning.  The legitimacy of the vote is further enhanced because of the high voter turnout.   

Kitimat has no jurisdiction as such over the pipeline so the vote the does not formally change anything.    With that in mind, the results were interesting

Here is the question asked:

Do you support the final report recommendations of the Joint Review Panel (JRP) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency and National Energy Board, that the Enbridge Northern Gateway project be approved, subject to 209 conditions set out in Volume 2 of the JRP's final report?

Results
Yes    1,278 41.6%
No     1,793 58.4%
total  3,071
Turnout 62%

The turnout is impressive.   Compare to the 2011 municipal elections when 2,426 people voted, this is a significant increase in voters.   A total of 761 new people registered to vote in the plebiscite.   That is a a 18% increase in voters.   In 2011 the new registrations were only 5% of the eligible voters. 

Pipelines offer very few ongoing jobs so the biggest benefit to BC communities from Enbridge would be in the form of property taxes.   The one community that would have any measurable increase in jobs would be Kitimat because they would be home to the terminal.   The oil shipment terminal and work related to ship movements will provide more jobs than the pipeline but still Kitimat voted no.

The last 20 years have been an ongoing hard time for rural resource towns in BC.   In a lot of these towns there is an attitude of anything goes as long as it bring jobs among large sections of the opinion leaders.   The fact that there was such a strong no vote is shocking.

The vote could be dismissed if no one voted, but the turnout was high.   Not only high, but higher than the last municipal elections.

Kitimat may not have jurisdiction over the pipeline decision, but the vote is a very important political signal.   If the pipeline can not be sold in Kitimat it is a political loser for any party that backs Enbridge.    Realistically the BC NDP and BC Liberals will not lift a finger for this pipeline.

Some data on IPPs in BC

There is a lot of talk about the impact of BC Hydro purchase agreements with independent power producers but people seem to think it is all from run of river projects, but that is not really the case all.   People also blame the Liberals for independent power production, but the reality is that more than half of the power purchased by BC Hydro comes from projects predating the BC Liberal government.

As of October 2013 BC Hydro has 82 active energy purchase agreements in place producing 15,317 GwH/yr.  The data comes from a list regularly provided by BC Hydro.

The six largest EPAs represent 8,474 GwH/yr of power, 55.3% of the IPP power BC Hydro purchases.  Only one of them is a run of the river hydro project.
Facility               Type            Location       GwH/yr
Alcan                  storage hydro   Kitimat        3,307
Island Generation      gas fired       Campbell River 2,300
McMahon Generating     gas fired       Taylor           840
Arrow Lakes Hydro      storage hydro   Slocan           767
East Toba and Montrose non storage hydro Powell River   715
NWE Willams Lake WW    wood waste cogen Williams Lake   545

By type
Type               Number  GwH/yr  % of total 
Large storage hydro   2    3,983    26.0%
Non storage hydro    46    3,624    23.7%
Gas fired             2    3,140    20.5%
Biomass              11    2,388    15.6%
Wind                  3    1,031     6.7%
Small storage hydro   8      789     5.2%
Other                 4      271     1.8%
Biogas                6       91     0.6%

Biomass tend to be wood waste cogeneration plants
Other is three energy recovery projects and one municipal solid waste project
Biogas comes from landfills

1/5th of the private power comes from fossil fuels and just over a quarter comes from traditional large storage hydro projects.   This means only 53.5% comes from what could be called green power.

By call
Call      Projects  GwH/yr  % of total
Before 1991  27     2,050    13.4%
1991-2001     6     3,225    21.1%
2001-2005    19     1,465     9.6%
2006-2008    24     6,013    39.3%
2009-now     16     2,557    16.7%

2006-2009 includes 3,307 GwH/yr from Alcan which is a renewal and not a new agreement.  BC Hydro has purchased power from Alcan since 1961.    If one considers Alcan pre Liberal power, only 6,728 GwH/yr is purchased from projects approved under the BC Liberals, or only 43.9% of the power purchased by BC Hydro from IPPs.

Grassy Point proposed LNG terminal location

One the proposed locations for LNG terminals in BC is at the north western most part of the Tsimpsean peninsula.  Four companies have responded to the provincial governments request for proposals for the site - Nexen, Woodside Petroleum of Australia, SK E&S of Korea and Imperial Oil.  I honestly have not understood why the interest in a site so far from the existing infrastructure.

The location for the proposed Grassy Point LNG terminals is only about 10-12 kilometers from Port Simpson but 40 to 45 kilometers from the end of the road in Prince Rupert.   To access the location at Grassy point about 30 kilometers of new road will have to built and 12 to 15 kilometers of the existing road to Port Simpson from the ferry terminal at the head of Tuck Inlet would have to be upgraded.  As well there will have to be a 500 to 600 metre long bridge over Fern Passage.

I do not know what it would cost to build this road but I am assuming the province will absorb that cost and not the LNG plants themselves.   Whatever the cost to the province, the road would have benefits beyond the LNG plants

The construction of the road will be of huge benefit to Lax Kw'alaams.  With close to 800 people in Port Simpson, they are amoderate sized community with no connection to the highway system of the province.  At the moment you need to take MV Nicola from Prince Rupert to get to Port Simpson.   The trip is too long for people to live at Port Simpson and work in Prince Rupert and consequently the on reserve population is not nearly as high as it could be.

One problem many remote First Nation communities have in BC is the difficulty in getting the membership that gets an education to move back.   There are simply not enough opportunities for people to be able to move home and make a living.   Connecting Port Simpson by road to Prince Rupert will have solve this problem for Lax Kw'alaams.

The construction of LNG terminals at Grassy Point would also lead to a demand for local services for the site and those services would most easily come from Port Simpson.   This would be an important source of jobs and economic activity for the community.   If Law Kw'alaams is willing to consider it, development of reserve lands could allow them to raise revenue from property taxes and get them some independence from Indian Affairs.

How far down the road to committing to building an LNG plant will a company have to go for the province to step in start the construction of the road?   I assume ideally the road would be complete before the construction of the LNG plant would begin.

Another cost is the construction of the powerline to Grassy Point.  Once again I assume the costs will be borne by the government of constructing a large enough transmission line.   The current power line running to Port Simpson is nowhere close to what would be needed for an LNG plant.

One major objection that will be raised against the use of Grassy Point is that the northwest tip of the Tsimpsean peninsula is unroaded wilderness.   Are there not better locations closer to Port Edward or have all the good spots been taken already?   In the environmental assessment process this issue will be the major hurdle the government and companies will have to overcome.   If there had been existing logging roads it would be a lot easier within the process.

I am still not convinced of the economics of LNG for the long term.  So far companies have not had to put much money down.  I am still afraid the provincial government is going to be on the hook for a lot of costs up front with no guarantees of success.  My skepticism will lessen when actual construction work begins on at least on LNG plant.

The "Site C" dam does not make economic sense to me

On many levels building the "Site C" dam on the Peace River is attractive.   The Peace already has two dams on it so much of the damage has already been done and the Site C location would simply capture more power.   It will have some significant impacts on the Peace River valley but I think the bigger impact is the cost of the project.   I think the current estimate of $7,900,000,000 is likely way too low and the final cost will be much higher than that making this very expensive power to bring online, more expensive than buying power from independent power producers.

The Peace River power projects first came about in the 1950s with Axel Wenner-Gren's bold proposals for Northern BC.   From this evolved Premier WAC Bennett's Two Rivers policy for developing hydro power in BC - the Columbia system and the Peace River.   Two dams were completed on the Peace River and serious consideration was to have two more.   What there is left of this project now is the "Site C" location.

Peace Dams - built and proposed

• The WAC Bennett Dam was finished in 1968 and created the very large Williston Reservoir and produces 13,100 GWh/yr.   It is located 18 kilometers west of Husdon's Hope
• The Peace Canyon Dam was finished in 1980 and created the small Dinosaur Reservoir and produces 3,500 GWh/yr.  It is located 21 kilometers downstream from the WAC Bennett Dam and 7 kilometers upstream from Hudson's Hope
• "Site A" dropped in favour of "Site C"
• "Site B" dropped because of bad geology
• "Site C" is located 83 kilometers downstream from the Peace Canyon Dam and 7 kilometers west of Fort St John.   It would produce about 5.100 GWh/yr
• "Site D" dropped because of bad geolocy
• "Site E" was proposed just to the west of the BC Alberta border on the Peace River.  It was dropped as an option in the 1980s

Locations that have been considered for dams on the Peace

BC Hydro has never let go of the idea of developing "Site C" even though it was dormant enough after 1991 that everyone thought the idea was dead.   It is now very seriously under consideration, in fact BC Hydro is acting as it is a done deal.   The one aspect of the project that concerns me more than any other is the cost to build the dam.

The early stage estimate in 2007 was for it to cost $6,600,000,000 to build the Site C dam on the Peace River.  In May 2011 this had been raised to $7,900,000,000.

Given the stage of the project and the nature of public sector capital project estimates, I see the real construction costs of this project being in the range of $10,000,000,000 to $20,000,000,000.   Amortized over 30 years the construction cost per KWh is $0.0654 to $0.118.   What this means is that the construction costs alone of this power will be likely be higher than what BC Hydro will be able to sell the power for.   To arrive at my numbers I simply took the project costs that I suspect it will be and divided it by 30 years of power production.

In the May 2011 BC Hydro estimated a project cost of $7,900,000,000.  BC Hydro estimates the cost of the power to be $0.087 to $0.095 per MWh.  Most of this cost is from the costs to build the project

Based on the likely costs of the "Site C" project and what it costs BC Hydro to produce power, it would seem that BC Hydro would have to sell the power for about $0.09 to $0.14 per KWh to break even in 2020 with this rising to $0.12 to $0.17 per KWh in 2040.   BC Hydro currently buys power from IPPs at an average of $0.068 per KWh and most of their purchase agreements are set up in such a way that this price is highly unlikely to reach $0.10 per KWh anytime soon.   Building "Site C" will cost BC Hydro more than relying on the private sector.

"Site C" only makes sense if the cost of power is affordable and if it is the best option for more power in this province.   What I have not seen is a good business case for why "Site C" is economically the best option for BC.  The 2007 feasibility study certainly does not make a strong case because it does not look at what the other options are out there.

At the moment BC Hydro's latest call for power is at roughly $0.10 per KWh which then rises at half the rate of inflation for the term of the contract which is anywhere from 20 to 40 years.   The latest call for power is only available for very small projects, the upper limit is a capacity of 15 MW which is why the rates  are higher than for previous IPPs.   Because BC Hydro will only cover half the rate of inflation, it means that over time the cost of the IPP electricity will fall in adjusted terms.  A purchase agreement now for $0.10 per KWh would be $0.135 in 20 years with 3% inflation.  If the full rate of inflation were applied it would be $0.181.  

With the latest call for very small scale power projects that is on offer BC Hydro, the company can be reasonably certain of new IPP power built now being available in 2040 for about $0.135 per KWh.   The cost of getting that power from "Site C" will be roughly the same cost but with BC Hydro taking all the risk.  A new larger scale call for green power in BC will very likely make power available to BC Hydro in the short term - less than five years - for significantly less than the cost of "Site C" power.

BC Hydro will add about 8,500 GWh/yr of power from new IPPs coming online over the next few years.   The cost of all of this power will be cheaper than constructing "Site C".  BC Hydro is already getting over 1,000 GWh/yr from projects that were part of the 2010 integrated power call.

The economics of "Site C" simply make it a bad risk for BC Hydro and the province.   For that reason alone I do not think we should go ahead with the project.

The changing nature of mining in BC

BC used to be home to a mining industry that was dominated by the metals sector but since 2008 the coal industry has been the dominate part of the mining industry in BC in terms of revenues.    I am not sure this has really sunk into the public's mind but we have to understand what it means to us to have our mining industry dominated by coal production.

There are four broad areas of the mining industry in BC

• Metal mines - gold, silver, copper, zinc, molybdenum and lead
• Coal mines 
• Industrial minerals - sulphur, barite, lime, cement, pumice, gypsum, zeolites and a host of others
• Construction aggregates - sand, gravel and stone

Most industrial minerals and construction aggregates are from smaller scale operations without large scale workforces and much of the materials are used in BC.    Before 1979 the value of coal produced in BC was less than these two mining sectors combined.

Since the late 1980s BC has normally produced between 23 and 27 million tonnes of coal per year.   Coal mining is up in dollar values and not in quantity of coal produced, yet.   With the numerous new mines being proposed for the North East, BC could very well see a significant expansion in coal production in BC.

Historically BC was not much of a coal mining centre even though we had our own coal barons in the form of the Dunsmirs.   The historical industry reached a peak in 1910 with just over 3 million tonnes produced which happened during some lean years for metal mines in BC.   By 1960 coal mining was less than 5% of the value of the BC mining industry.

The modern BC coal industry ramped up in the 1970s going from less than one million tonnes in 1969 to over ten million in 1979 with value of production rising by 8000% over the same time.   The rise in value of the metal mining sector over the same time was 350%.

In terms of revenues, the metal mining sector was normally 30-100% larger than the coal sector from 1987 to 2007.

The coal sector increase in value comes in part because of the rise in the value of coal.   At the same the metal sector has seen production of some metals drop to production levels not seen since the 19th century.

• In 2011 BC only produced 2,650,651 grams of gold, the lowest level of production since 1895.   In 2000 BC produced 25,129,245 grams of gold.   The value of gold produced in 2011 was the lowest since 1985 and I am not considering any inflation.
• In 2011 57,685 kilograms of silver was produced, down from 676,870 kg in 2003.   Once again, the lowest production since 1895.
• In 2011 424,603 kg of lead was produced,  the lowest level since 1892.  In 1985 BC produced 116,811,328 kg of lead  
• Zinc was low in 2011 but not as low as the others.   26,662,908 kg was produced which is the lowest level of production since 1922.   In 2000 BC produced 145,516,482 kg

Only molybdenum and copper did not see dramatic drops in production the last few years.

What all this means is that BC is getting very dependent on mining coal for government revenues.  Combine this with natural gas and oil revenues and we have a government that is setting itself up for a potential crash should more countries take the idea of climate change seriously.

Globally we will potentially become a target of the climate change movement if the provincial government is so dependent on coal, oil and gas.   The carbon tax in BC may be lauded by many, but it does nothing to deal with the production and export of the carbon based fuels.   Maybe the time has come for BC to consider applying a carbon tax on the coal produced in BC, something in the range of $30 to $50 a tonne.

Table of value of various sectors of the BC mining industry from 1980 to 2011

	Industrial	Metal	total construction aggregates	Coal	Total mining revenues
2011	$456,734,763.00	$2,095,597,004.00	$349,023,032.00	$5,691,021,000.00	$8,592,375,799.00
2010	$348,512,304.00	$2,191,323,516.00	$372,892,236.00	$4,253,436,000.00	$7,166,164,056.00
2009	$283,057,000.00	$1,888,083,285.00	$303,095,604.00	$3,297,307,786.00	$5,771,543,675.00
2008	$695,681,553.00	$2,589,610,944.00	$378,205,491.00	$3,738,496,000.00	$7,401,993,988.00
2007	$424,109,938.00	$2,887,070,973.00	$347,180,884.00	$1,948,999,000.00	$5,607,360,795.00
2006	$363,206,871.00	$3,248,374,777.00	$273,732,745.00	$2,105,270,000.00	$5,990,584,393.00
2005	$364,087,860.00	$2,441,988,135.00	$278,118,675.00	$2,299,634,000.00	$5,383,828,670.00
2004	$354,618,471.00	$1,955,515,694.00	$238,521,017.00	$1,190,920,000.00	$3,739,575,182.00
2003	$336,096,928.00	$1,353,068,391.00	$226,300,499.00	$971,517,000.00	$2,886,982,818.00
2002	$309,692,978.00	$1,287,959,868.00	$230,541,229.00	$1,034,862,000.00	$2,863,056,075.00
2001	$295,985,001.00	$1,394,462,073.00	$216,625,413.00	$959,292,000.00	$2,866,364,487.00
2000	$284,146,412.00	$1,571,163,102.00	$223,914,400.00	$812,073,000.00	$2,891,296,914.00
1999	$246,407,790.00	$1,183,003,686.00	$218,524,113.00	$796,903,000.00	$2,444,838,589.00
1998	$245,494,740.00	$1,483,720,831.00	$208,078,660.00	$955,990,000.00	$2,893,284,231.00
1997	$249,376,474.00	$1,495,314,962.00	$195,365,474.00	$1,106,880,000.00	$3,046,936,910.00
1996	$251,072,820.00	$1,537,248,261.00	$189,223,177.00	$1,026,580,000.00	$3,004,124,258.00
1995	$249,220,932.00	$2,016,377,674.00	$204,133,515.00	$968,270,000.00	$3,438,002,121.00
1994	$236,907,624.00	$1,354,350,790.00	$180,323,789.00	$860,900,000.00	$2,632,482,203.00
1993	$228,700,638.00	$1,198,412,727.00	$166,060,668.00	$822,250,000.00	$2,415,424,033.00
1992	$211,629,900.00	$1,501,696,726.00	$157,130,231.00	$706,300,000.00	$2,576,756,857.00
1991	$289,960,960.00	$1,510,942,029.00	$159,101,891.00	$989,510,000.00	$2,949,514,880.00
1990	$305,483,271.00	$1,622,514,307.00	$163,300,174.00	$1,000,615,000.00	$3,091,912,752.00
1989	$278,307,289.00	$1,828,638,602.00	$177,847,749.00	$1,058,990,000.00	$3,343,783,640.00
1988	$247,060,966.00	$1,961,595,563.00	$142,034,875.00	$974,400,000.00	$3,325,091,404.00
1987	$230,258,476.00	$1,557,322,358.00	$160,950,917.00	$947,860,000.00	$2,896,391,751.00
1986	$210,233,807.00	$1,200,415,825.00	$126,861,497.00	$973,767,000.00	$2,511,278,129.00
1985	$215,399,383.00	$1,080,462,099.00	$138,110,277.00	$1,089,675,000.00	$2,523,646,759.00
1984	$197,919,044.00	$1,086,328,701.00	$124,154,204.00	$1,016,985,000.00	$2,425,386,949.00
1983	$169,352,732.00	$1,192,373,393.00	$139,540,000.00	$573,962,000.00	$2,075,228,125.00
1982	$175,094,270.00	$1,142,075,461.00	$96,446,000.00	$619,900,000.00	$2,033,515,731.00
1981	$180,322,174.00	$1,397,118,688.00	$108,272,000.00	$540,800,000.00	$2,226,512,862.00
1980	$217,816,167.00	$1,473,558,832.00	$139,992,056.00	$445,430,000.00	$2,276,797,055.00

Northern Gateway Pipeline, the government of BC has a Veto

The Northern Gateway pipeline has to cross Crown lands in BC to reach the coast.   To cross these lands the company has to apply to BC for an interest in the land.   Nowhere in BC legislation is there anything that says that the BC government has to grant any form of interest to Enbridge for their pipeline.  

Enbridge has to come to BC and ask to use the land and BC is allowed to say no.

Lands are under the control of the provincial Crown, not the federal Crown in Canada.   In the case of BC Crown lands were under the control of BC before it joined in Canada in 1871.   As opposed to the prairies or northern Ontario and Quebec, BC Crown lands have never had any underlying federal Crown allodial title .    The route of the pipeline in BC is owned by the government of BC, not Enbridge, not Canada and not Alberta.  In BC the First Nations have a much better claim to lands than the federal Crown does.

The federal government could in theory try to expropriate but the federal government is not building the pipeline so they have has no direct interest or reason to expropriate the lands.    Also, expropriating land to benefit one private company would would violate NAFTA and the new Canada China free trade agreements among other agreements.   The core of most free trade agreements is that governments to do not favour one company over another one, expropriation is a tool that violates this in the most fundamental way when done on behalf of a private company.

The best reason I know of  that the federal government has had to expropriate lands would to settle Treaties with First Nations - guess what, this is apparently not a good enough reason to be able to succeed.  If it had been the federal government could have settled the Nisga'a Treaty in 1977 and not 1996.

Expropriation for a single proposal from a private company sets a horrific precedence.   In the case of the Northern Gateway pipeline there are numerous other options for the the oil industry that they can pursue if this pipeline is not built.   They could build a line to Churchill Manitoba. or to Thunder Bay, or use rail cars, or ship more into the US, or refine it in Alberta, or build a pipeline through to Cherry Point in Washington.   There are no shortage of other options.   There is no critical and fundamental reason why the Northern Gateway pipeline needs to be built.

The federal government could make BC's lands laws null and and void through the federal power of disallowance, I think.   I am not sure they can do this for laws already in place and it has to be done by the Lieutenant Governor of BC.  Even though this is a right the federal Crown has, I am not sure that legally they could use it in this case because it certainly does not seem to be what was envisaged the power would be used for.   The power seems to have been created as a way for the federal Crown to disallow a recently passed provincial law that is clearly unfair, illegal or interferes in federal Crown powers.   None of this applies in this case.  Also, since this power has not been used in about 70 years and the emerging nature of Canada is that this is a lost power of the federal Crown.

If the federal government were to try and use the power of disallowance or any sort of massive expropriation would ensure all the provinces would be in direct and total conflict with the feds.   It would destroy the popularity of the Conservatives and lead to the demand for a re-writing of the constitution to reduce the powers of the federal Crown.   It would also put BC and Canada in the courts for years to resolve the legal issue.  While is was before the courts there would be no movement on the pipeline.  

A very interesting upshot of the federal government using expropriation would be First Nations' ownership of the land.   There is a good case for the First Nations to have a higher and more pressing right to any lands the federal Crown acquires.   It also means in BC the federal government becomes more or less obliged to use expropriation to settle Treaties in BC.

What all this means is that BC has a veto over the pipeline.   If BC says no there is nothing anyone will be able to do about it.   If Enbridge, Alberta and the federal government want to see this pipeline, they should be bending over backwards to address the issues of BC and of First Nations.

Smart Meters as a Human Rights Violation?

The BC Human Rights Tribunal has decided that there is a complaint that could be heard with respect to wireless smart meters though it is not entirely clear if there will be anyone that can meet the criteria.  The media is reporting it as a quasi win for the Citizens for Safe Technology but I think it is much less clear than that.

I think the complaint is people opposed to greening the power grid looking for any last straws to grasp to try and stop BC Hydro modernizing the grid.

The focus of the complaint is that Citizens for Safe Technology Society asked for wired smart meters to be provided by BC Hydro to people with a health diagnosis saying they should avoid wireless meters.  BC Hydro quite reasonably refused because the expense to provide wired smart meters for people that are suffering stress and blaming radio signals for it.  The BCHRT was deciding if there was a complaint to be heard.

Tribunal member Enid Marion decided that there could a complaint heard if the complaint met the following:

1. The individual is a resident of British Columbia. 
2. The individual resides in a residence and/or a residential complex that gets its electricity from Hydro. 
3. The individual has been advised, in writing, by a physician licensed to practice medicine in all or part of Canada, to avoid, for  reasons of illness and/or disability, residing in a residence and/or residential complex at which a wireless smart meter device is operating. 
4. The individual, on his/her own behalf or by way of a representative, has requested, as an accommodation, that Hydro refrain from installing and/or operating a wireless smart meter at the individual’s place of residence and/or residential complex 
5. Within three weeks of making the request for accommodation, the individual has not received an unconditional written commitment from Hydro that it will refrain from installing and/or operating a wireless smart meter at the individual’s place of residence and/or residential complex. (“Defining Characteristics”) 

This is a reasonable set of criteria and ultimately the only aspect that really matter is the third and much of the decision talks about this.   Without a diagnosis nothing can happen.

From the ruling:

[34] Third, I accept that the complaint, with one exception, alleges various disabilities, including EHS. The exception is the reference to “unspecified medical conditions”. In my view, such an assertion is too vague to form the basis of a complaint.  
[35] I also agree with Citizens that it is not necessary, at this point in the proceeding, to provide medical proof of an alleged disability. Such evidence would be required in the context of an application to dismiss the complaint, a hearing on the merits of the complaint, or at the request of the Tribunal as a preliminary matter.

The ruling says the complaint is too broad.   The tribunal decision also does not decide if anyone meets the terms of being ill with some EHS or something similar or even if there is anything at all like EHS at all.

[56] First, I agree with Hydro that the complaint casts too broad a net. It is simply unmanageable to have a plethora of various medical conditions that must be proven and linked to the adverse treatment. The issues and evidence respecting whether the various conditions constitute a disability, whether there is a nexus between the disability and the adverse treatment, and if so whether Hydro either has proven a  bona fide  reasonable justification for the installation of wireless Smart Meters or reasonably accommodated the disability will be of differing complexity and focus, dependent on the nature of the alleged disability.  
[57] Second, while I accept that membership  in a class may be open-ended, the defining characteristics must be specific enough to clearly delineate membership. I agree with Hydro that, as currently framed, any person with a medical condition, diagnosed or undiagnosed, could conceivably fall within the class. Such broad membership means that that there will be divergent issues of fact and law among the members of the class, given the types of evidence and legal arguments  to be made in respect of each alleged disability, the impact (if any) of wireless Smart Meter technology on the disability and the form of resultant accommodation required, if any. 

[58] I also note in this regard that the disability, or particulars of the medical condition, must be specified. A vague and medically-unsubstantiated reference by a physician to avoid wireless technology is insufficient to constitute a disability. There must be a medical diagnosis, as well as a contraindication for exposure to such technology because of its effect on the medical condition.  

Clearly for someone to have a complaint the person has to be able to have a doctor's note with a diagnosis with a specific remedy of not being near any radio signals.  What this means is that any complaint will focus around the doctor's diagnosis and it will be a battle of experts.   Since all the science indicates that radio signals are not harmful to humans it will be effectively impossible to get a complaint accepted because of this hurdle.

A GP somewhere in BC diagnosing something that does not exist as an ailment is going to have really hard time justifying the diagnosis in any sort of formal tribunal setting.

Here is the ending of the decision:

Summary
[77] In summary, I have concluded that the complaint alleges a potential breach of the Code, Citizens is an appropriate representative, but that the class, as currently defined, is overly broad. 
[78] If Citizens wishes to amend its complaint to restrict the class to those persons allegedly diagnosed with EHS who have been advised to avoid wireless technology, then it must file such an amendment within 30 days of the date of this decision.  

[79] If it does so, then the Tribunal will schedule a pre-hearing conference call to discuss any issues arising out of the amendment, including whether to invite written submissions or, alternatively, hold a hearing on the discrete issue of whether or not EHS is a disability for the purposes of the Code.

What is also important here is this decision does not decide if EHS is actually a disability as described in the Human Rights Code.   That would have to proven first.

BC Hydro can now apply to have the complaint dismissed on the grounds there is no such thing as EHS.

One final thought on smart meters, who clearly suffers the most from the switch to the smart grid in BC?  Who loses the most money through that shift?   As far as I can tell the smart grid will cost the grow op business in BC a fortune of money.  Right now grow op operators can steal power to their heart's content without almost no danger of being caught, once the smart grid is in place power theft becomes very hard to do.   I have to wonder what involvement there is from the BC drug underworld in opposition to smart meters.

The David Black Refinery Proposal - quick first thoughts

Today a new factor has been thrown into the Northern Gateway Pipeline proposal - plans for a huge refinery between Terrace and Kitimat, one of the biggest in the world and would be able to process all of the oil in the proposed Enbridge Pipeline.   The proposed refinery is call Kitimat Clean and to be the greenest and cleanest refinery in the world.

The Economics:
At 550,000 barrels of oil per day, the refinery would be the 7th largest in the world if it was open now.  It would produce 240,000 barrels of diesel, 100,000 barrels of gasoline and 50,000 barrels of kerosene.  It would also recover around 150,000 barrels of diluent.  The heavy crude from the tar sands needs a diluent to allow it to flow through the pipeline.   At the moment this would have to brought into BC and then sent via pipeline to Alberta.   The refinery would recover this meaning fewer tankers would be needed to export the products produced and there would be no need to bring in diluent from the other side of the ocean,

Based on the prices today the oil in the pipeline has a value of about $38,000,000 a day to the Canadian economy.  The refined product would have a ballpark value of around $50,000,000 a day.  This is not a large added value, I am actually surprised that there is only a 30% or so increase in value added through the refining process.   The total value added to the Canadian economy would would be around $4,200,000,000 per year.   Keep in mind these numbers are ballpark ones to give us an idea of the scale we are talking about.

It would employ 3,000 people, which for the Terrace-Kitimat area is a huge number.  At the moment Kitimat has 8,335 people and Terrace 11,486, another 3,988 in KSRD area E, 2696 in KSRD area C and 1200 people living on reserves for a total population of a 27,705 people living in the area.  The current labour force in the region is about 15,250 people which means the refinery alone would mean close to a 20% increase in the labour force.   The retail, service and government sectors would see an increase of about 2000 jobs.  All of this would mean an increased population of about 9,000 more people than now.

Total new wages in the area would be about $400,000,000 a year.

The refinery would provide the Kitimat-Stikine Regional District with a huge increase in property taxes.  I am not even sure how to estimate it because the numbers sound so large - think hundreds of millions.

The refinery would provide the provincial and federal government with something on the order of $500,000,000 in new tax revenues for all sources.   The number sounds large but I am estimating low.

The $13,000,000,000 cost estimate is early and will likely be much larger as the process goes along, I would think that it is safe assume the cost will more like $20,000,000,000 to $25,000,000,000.  This is a lot of money, by far the single largest investment in BC history.   There is no one and no business in BC that has the financial capacity to raise this much money.  Without a serious partner with deep products the project has no real future.   As far as I can tell, refineries tend to belong to vertically integrated oil companies.

The timeline is very ambitious, the goal is to start construction in 2014.  The timeline of the environmental assessment is not likely to finish that fast and I can not see how it will be possible to raise the money to build it without first having approval to build.

The Environment:
The proposal changes nothing about the issues related to the pipeline crossing BC especially with respect to aboriginal land.   There is little point in going forward unless the Enbridge pipeline is approved.   There is little chance of the pipeline managing to go ahead without some sort of consent of the First Nations.

The refinery itself would have a significant impact on the location where it is proposed to be built.  Canada would also have a serious increase in CO2 emissions.  At the moment our oil is exported and refined elsewhere and those countries are on the hook for the CO2.  Though overall the CO2 emissions would be no worse and I suspect in a number of ways lower with this proposal.

The proposal reduces the number of tankers coming to Kitimat but it still means a dramatic increase in traffic from the status quo.

The Politics:
This proposal is clearly beneficial for the government and puts the NDP in a quandary.   The NDP in their opposition to Enbridge made it clear that one of the problems was that the oil was not being refined here in BC.   3,000 high paying jobs, many of them union, is not something NDP can lightly dismiss.

The proposal is a good out for Alison Redford because the refinery would spread the wealth and she would not have to consider a deal with BC to share royalties to ensure the pipeline would go ahead.

I am not sure how this plays our federally.

I am also not sure how this plays out with China - will the oil be available for a Canadian refinery?  Enbridge is not the owner of the oil, they simply transport it.   The Northern Gateway pipeline is a way to get more crude to China and I suspect they really are not interested in selling to a Canadian refiner.

The NDP and the Enbridge Pipeline

I was listening to Adrian Dix this morning on CBC Radio 1 On The Island where he was talking about the NDP letter to the Joint Review Panel on the Northern Gateway Pipeline.   The NDP letter seems to focus first and foremost on the economic arguments for or against the pipeline.   This brings with it questions on where the NDP is positioned natural resource issues.

Gregor Craigie asked Adiran Dix about the position of the NDP on more refineries in BC given that the NDP called for more value added use of the resource in the letter.   Adrian Dix managed to avoid saying if the NDP supports more refineries in BC or not.   Clearly he did not want to say yes to more refineries but he did not want to shoot down the value added argument of their submission.  

If one is looking to build new refineries, decent coastal ports with good rail links offer the ability to move large scales of refined products.   Pipelines are good for a single commodity but are not ideal for multiple products.   The implication of the NDP letter is that the Enbridge pipeline would make a lot of economic sense if one were to build a large refinery complex in Terrace.   Is this what the NDP is seeking?  Is this what people in the North West want?

It all says to me that the the NDP caucus is not opposed to the pipeline if there are enough economic benefits for BC to out weigh the economic risks and is not opposed to the tar sands as a concept.

Of primary to me with respect to the pipeline are the title and rights of the First Nations.   First Nations along the pipeline route have real ownership rights to the land and this means their consent is needed.  I do not think the NDP accepts that the First Nations have ownership rights or that their consent is required.

Here is the text from the NDP letter on the issue:


Respecting First Nations' interests
The proposed pipeline traverses the traditional territory of a number of B.C. First Nations. It will thus directly affect the aboriginal rights of these Nations. These rights, whether or not proven, must be identified and addressed in accordance with the duty to consult set out in law. The impact of the pipeline, and even worse an oil leak or spill, will be most severely felt by First Nation communities who depend on the land and waters of their traditional territories for their economic, social and cultural well-being.


It is imperative that First Nations be consulted effectively and be respected at a government-to government level, in keeping with honour of the Crown and in the manner repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada. Aboriginal rights and title must be recognized through full and complete engagement in accordance with consultation requirements set out by the Court.


The future economic and social development of B.C. is dependent on respectful and mutually beneficial relationships between First Nation and non-aboriginal communities. The unity achieved by some 130 First Nations in rejecting the NGP project and opposing the lifting of the ban on oil tankers on the north coast is significant; it must not be ignored.

First off, the NDP refers to the "interests" of First Nations.   First Nations do not have an interest in this issue, they have constitutional protected ownership of the land and rights to use the land.

The NDP manages to completely ignore the reality of aboriginal title and focus on the current legal minimum required of government when dealing with First Nations.   The NDP could have gone much further and said that the pipeline should not go ahead unless the First Nations have Treaties, effectively the message that Tom Berger delivered about the Mackenzie pipeline in the 1970s.

I negotiated at the Treaty table on behalf of First Nations during the eras of the NDP and Liberal governments.   The mandate of the province was much more limited and old school under the NDP.   The BC government under Gordon Campbell has gone farther than any other government in Canada in de facto recognizing aboriginal title and rights.   I read what the NDP has written and I see a clock running backwards.

It is this one sentence that bothers me the most Aboriginal rights and title must be recognized through full and complete engagement in accordance with consultation requirements set out by the Court.  It is going back to the old model of First Nations having to prove anything and everything in court before the government will accept that First Nations have any sort of right to the land.